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In 1963, around £79 million was held in solicitors' trust accounts in New South
Wales, Queensland and Victoria. I None of that earned interest. At the time,
banking regulations prohibited the crediting of interest to 'current accounts;2 -
bank accounts characterised by frequent deposits and withdrawals, the latter
usually by cheque. In offering solicitors trust account facilities, the banks therefore
got sizable sums by interest free loan: 'all the cream off the cake,.3 That was!o
change in the 1960s as the Law Institute ofVictoria pioneered a scheme for getting
banks indirectly to credit interest to trust account deposits and to direct that money
to fidelity funds and, later, to legal aid. Interest on Lawyers' Trust Fund Accounts
i(IOLTA) schemes then spread to other parts of Australia, and were later exported,
to New Zealand (NZ), Zimbabwe, South Africa, Canada and the United States
(US).4 Slowly refilled and expanded, Australian IOLTA schemes ¥e now
entrenched in the funding base for legal aid and the legal profession infrastnicture.
They now add well over $30 million every year to the budgets of the nation's leg~l
aid commissions.5
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I Helen Gregory, The Queensland Law Society Inc 1928-1988: A History (1991) at 174.
2 For instance, savings accounts (which earned interest) could not be operated by cheque: Banking
(Savings Bank) Regulations 1960 (Cth) r7. The rule was repealed with the deregulation of
banking in 1984: Banking (Savings Bank) Regulations (Amendment) 1984 (Cth) s5.
3 Allan Holding, Victoria, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1December
1963 at 2332.
4 Terry Boone, 'A Source ofRevenue for the Improvement ofLegal Services, Part I: An Analysis
of the Plans in Foreign Countries and Florida Allowing the Use of Clients' Funds Held by
Attorneys in Non~Interest-Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Organized Bar'
(1979) 10 St Mary's L1 539 at 542-550; Halimah DeLaine, 'The Importance of Nominal
Interest: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decision Regarding IOLTA Accounts' (1999) 13
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 183 at 184; Kristin Dulong, 'Exploring the Fifth
Dimension: IOLTA, Professional Responsibility, and the Takings Clause' (1997) 31 Suffolk
University LR 91 at 96 n26.
5 See below Table 5.
2. Method a/Collection
IOLTA schemes evidently help the public good, so far as that is promoted by
the work of the legal profession. However, despite the genesis ofIOLTA schemes
in Australia, they have, apart from Adrian Evans' pioneering work on the Victorian
IOLTA arrangements, received no scholarly attention.6 In this article, I therefore
explore and evaluate the structure, role and ethics of the present IOLTA schemes
in Australia and, agreeing with Evans, conclude that they are, so far as public
standards are concerned, structured unethically. I add, however, that the moral
character of IOLTA schemes can be salvaged, if they are reformed. In this article,
the means by which IOLTA is acquired by public agencies are therefore outlined
(part 2). Then, the different programs that are funded by IOLTA are discussed, with
particular focus on legal aid (Part 3). This enables an analysis of the public ethics
of IOLTA schemes, which is helped to a significant extent by the literature and
adjudication on IOLTA that has emerged in the US and the Scottish case ofBrown
v Inland Revenue Commissioners.7 I nevertheless take the judicial reasoning in
these cases as exemplifying and guiding moral reflection on the structure of
rOLTA schemes, rather than giving them legal direction (Part 4). The discussion of
the public ethics of these schemes then informs conclusions on the best form that






The basic resources ofany IOLTA scheme are, ofcourse, solicitors' trust accounts.
Any money received by solicitors on another person's behalf is held under trust,8
and must (with only the most limited exceptions) be deposited in a general trust
account held separately from the solicitors' office account.9 The handling of any
6 Adrian Evans, The Development and Control ofthe Solicitors Guarantee Fund (Victoria) and
its Ethical Implications for the Legal Profession (LLM Thesis, Monash University, 1997)
(hereafter Solicitors Guarantee Fund); 'A Concise History of the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund
(Vic): A Marriage of Principle and Pragmatism' (2000) 26 Mon LR 75 (hereafter Principle and
Pragmatism); 'Whose Money? The Solicitors Guarantee Fund' (1993) 18 Alt LJ220 (hereafter
Whose Money); 'Trust in a Trust Account' (2002) 76(Dec) Law Inst J 78 (hereafter Tn/st).
7 [1965J AC 244 (hereafter Brown).
8 Re Batho (1868) I QSCR 196; In re Hallet's Estate; Knatchbull v Hallet (1879) 13 Ch D 696 at
702-703; Stumore v Campbell & CO [1892J I QB 314 at 316; Plunkett v Barclays Bank Limited
[1936] 2 K.B 107 at 117;In re a Solicitor [1952] Ch 328; ReJones (1953) 16 ABC 169; Adams
v Bank ofNew South Wales [1984] I NSWLR 285 at 290, 300--301; Target Holdings Ltd v
Redfern [1996J 1 AC 421 at 435-436; lalmoon Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bow [1997] 2 Qd 62 at 72;
Twinsectra Limited v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 at 168.
9 Legal Practitioners Act 1970 (ACT) ss90--91; Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) 561; Legal
Practitioners Act 1974 (NT) ss55-57; Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) s7(1); Legal Practitioners
Act 1981 (SA) s31; Legal Profession Act 1993 (Tas) s101; LegalPractice Act 1996 (Vic) ss173-
174; Legal Practitioners Act 1893 ey.rA) s34 (The Legal Profession, Legal Practitioners and
Legal Practice Acts are hereafter LPA).
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money in the trust account is then tightly regulated by statute, which effectively
provides that the money 'should only be paid out to the persons to whom [it]
belonged, or as they directed' .10 Significantly, this is money that the solicitors hold
only as trustees for others - 'clients' .11 The solicitors themselves do not own the
money beneficially, and it is not available for the firm's use. 12 .
The credit balance of the trust account thus represents a corpus of mixed trust
money held for different clients under different trusts, and the Acts directing its
management therefore provide statutory exceptions to the normal equitable
principle that money held under different trusts cannot be mingled in the one bank
account. 13 If instructions to do so are given, the solicitors can place the client's
money in a savings account, separate from the trust and any other accounts, where
it can earn that client interest. 14 In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and
NSW and under the proposed Model Laws on a National Legal Profession, this is
called 'controlled money' .15
The fact that trust account deposits are not, while in trust, a resource for the
firm does not mean that they have no potential value for the solicitors. A common
reason why solicitors ask for clients'to deposit money in trust is in anticipation of o'
Il - _ '
professional fees - 'costs' - that the client will be billed for later, and outlays
that will be incurred when cariying out the client's legal business. There are'often
strict controls on the payment of costs and outlays from money in trust,16 but it'is
plainly convenient to have the client's money for outlays at hand when it is needed.
Further, money deposited in trust in anticipation of costs gives the solicitors
assurance that, when rendered, bills can be paid, and helps to reduce the firm's
exposure to bad debtors. A nodding acquaintance with the disciplinary cases on
unauthorised remissions of trust money for the payment of bills suggests that it is
not uncommon for large amounts, held on account of costs and outlays, to be kept
in the trust accounffor long periods. 17 .-
10 In re A Practitioner ofthe Supreme Court (1941] SASR 48 at 51.
11 The term 'clients' includes any beneficiaries for whom solicitors hold money, whether or not
they have contractually retained the solicitors to conduct legal business for them.
12 Johns v Law Society ofNew South Wales [1982] 2 NSWLR 1 at 20-21.
13 Lupton v White (1808) 15 Yes 432; 33 ER 817; Lunham v Blundell (1857) 27 LJ Ch 179; Re
Todd (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 490. See Johns v Law Society ofNew South Wales [1982] 2 NSWLR
1 at 24.
14 LPA 1970 (ACT) s92; LPA 1987 (NSW) s61(9); LPA 1974 (NT) s58; Trust Accounts Act 1973
(Qld) s8(2); LPA 1981 (SA) s31(2); LPA 1993 (Tas) s101(5); LPA 1996 (Vic) s174(2); LPA
1893 (WA) s34.
15 LPA 1970 (ACT) s99A; LPA 1987 (NSW) s61(9); Standing Committee of Attorneys-General,
Legal Profession Model Laws Project - Model Provisions (2004) at 67 (5702).
16 Legal Profession Regulation 2002 (NSW) r78; Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) s8(1)(c); Trust
Account Practice Rules 1998 (Vic) r31(1)(b); LPA 1893 (WA) s34A. For procedures in other
states, see Gino Da1 Pont, Law ofCosts (2003) at 91-94.
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B. IOLTA Schemes in Australia: Basic Organisation
All states18 in Australia have two IOLTA schemes. As will be seen soon, the
'statutory deposits' schemes have interest raised on client money under a two-trust
structure, and the 'residual balances' schemes have interest raised under a single-
trust structure. The details even within each kind of scheme differ between states,
and there is no current plan to harmonise them. The Model Laws for a National
Legal Profession, prepared at the direction of the Standing Committee of
Attorneys-General, contemplate uniformity in the detail of regulations about
solicitors' trust account management,19 and also assume that each state will have
separate statutory deposits and residual balances IOLTA schemes.20 However,
even under the Model Laws the states can make their own regulations about how
much in trust accounts is to be placed under an IOLTA scheme, who is to regulate
it, and how the money is to be used.21 Indeed, the peculiarity of the IOLTA
arrangements in each state, aJ?-d their relationship to the funding of public
programs, were among the impediments to centralising the regulation of the legal
profession in Australia in a single federal agency.22 While IOLTA was probably
not a significant consideration in [mally reaching agreement on the form that a
National Legal Profession would take, the Attorneys have preferred to pursue
national legal practice by agreeing to uniform standards that are to be adopted by
each state.23 Accordingly, IOLTA schemes remain a state concern, with their
existing binary organisation unchallenged. When adopted in each state, the Model
Laws will require a relocation ofthe legal substructure oflOLTA from the existing
17 For example, ACT: Robb v Law Society ofthe Australian Capital Territory (1996) 72 FCR 225.
NSW: Law Society ofNew South Wales v Poynten [1999] NSWADT 21 at [20]; Law Society of
New South Wales v Shenker [1999] NSWADT 37; Law Society ofNew South Wales v Hughes. ';
[1999] NSWADT 44 at [86], [111J, [174], [188]; Law Society ofNe-.y S0!lth fYal€!sy B;;son-
Taylor [1999] NSWADT 41 at [17]-[18], [21]-[22], [29]; Law Society ofNew South Wales v
Cullen [1999] NSWADT 121 at [79]-[85]; Law Society ofNew South Wales v Bykowski [2002]
NSWADT 165 at [90], [95], [133], [192], [223]-[224]; Laurent v Law Society ofNew South
Wales [2002] NSWSC 655 at [67]-[70]. Qld: Re Crowley (1996) 1 Bi-Annual Report of
Disciplinary Action (BRDA) 6; Re Mallet (1998) 4 BRDA 5; Re Williams (1998) 4 BRDA 14;
Re Carberry (2000) 6 BRDA ·17 at 19; Queensland Law Society Inc v Carberry [2000] QCA
450 at [10]; Re Lancaster (2001) 813RDA 6 at 7-8; Re Quinn (2001) 8 BRDA 21 at 21-25; Re
Lavery (2001) 9 BRDA 1 at 3; Re Nielsen-Brown (2002) 10 BRDA 16; Re Partos (2002) 10
BRDA 34 at 34-35; Re Lawrence (2002) 10 BRDA 52. Vic: Victorian Lawyers RPA Ltd v
Incerti [2001] VSC 15 at [9]-[10]. WA: Re a'Practitioner [2001] WASCA 154 at [8];
Lashansky v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2002] WASCA 326 at [34]; Re a
Practitioner [2003] WASCA 172 at [23]-[24].
18 When used generically, the term 'states' includes the ACT and the Northern Territory (NT).
19 Standing Committe~ of Attorneys-General, above n15 at 66-89 (ss701-745).
20 Id at 86-87 (s741).
21 Ibid. . ..
22 Law Council of Australia, Submission to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General -
Towards National Practice (2001) at 12.
23 State, Territory and Commonwealth Attorneys-General, Historic Agreement on National Legal
Profession, Communique (7 August 2003).
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legislation to the Model Laws themselves. Queensland is the first to do this: the
Legal Profession Act 2004 promising simpler procedures and closer government
controls of lOLTA. 24
C. Interest on Statutory Deposits
The original means by which interest on trust account deposits was acquired for
public programs in Australia was the requirement that solicitors set aside defined
portions of trust money, which they lodged in designated savings accounts separate
to their own trust account. Terminology has differed from state to state,25 but in
this article the separate accounts are called 'statutory deposit accounts' (SDAs) in
which the solicitors lodge amounts of trust money called 'statutory deposits'. The
sidling of money from the trust account into a savings account to earn interest for
anyone (including the client) is in normal conditions illegal, unless the solicitors
have specific written authority from the client to .do that. This abnormal payment
of trust money to an SDA is therefore directed by the governing Act.26,
The SDAs are either held by the local law society,27 a statutory trustee
corporation on Which the law society is represented,28 a professional regulato~9
or, under the new Queensland rules: the government itself30 - any of which (in
this rol~) I will refer to as the 'IOLTA Trustee'. In NSW and Victoria, the IOLTA
Trustee is expressly stated to hold the statutory deposit on trust for thelodgmg
solicitors,31 and elsewhere the trust relationship is implicit in its designation and
duties. 32 The client money therefore seems to be held under at least two strata of
trusts: the IOLTA Trustee holding the statutory deposit (as trust capital) for the
solicitors but the interest on that deposit (as trust income) for other purposes, and
the solicitors holding that amount, albeit in mixed funds, for clients. Lodging the
statutory deposit with The IOLTATrustee effectively turns the trust between the
24 LPA 2004 (Qld) ss202-211.
25 ACT: 'statutory deposits account'; NSW: 'special account'; Qld: 'special account' or
'prescribed account'; SA: 'combined trust account'; Tas: 'designated trust deposit account';
Vic: 'statutory deposit account'.
26 LPA 1970 (ACT) ssI23(l)--{3); LPA \987 (NSW) s64(1); LPA 1974 (NT) ss80(l)--{3); Trust
Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) s8(1)(b); LPA 1995 (Qld) s51(2); LPA 2004 (Qld) s205; Legal
Profession Regulation 2004 (Qld) s8(1); LPA 1981 (SA) s53(\); LPA 1993 (Tas) sI02(1); LPA
1996 (Vic) ssI79(1), 180(1); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) sl1(2). See also Boone,
above n4 at 543-544.
27 LPA 1970 (ACT) ssI23(l)--{3), 127(1); LPA 1987 (NSW) s65(I)(a); LPA 1995 (Qld) s51(7);
LPA 1981 (SA) ss5(1), 53(1).
28 LPA 1974 (NT) ss79A(4), 80(l)--{3) (the Legal Practitioners' Trust Committee); LPA 1993
(Tas) ss96(I)(a), 98(1) (the Solicitors' Trust); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) ss4,
6(1)(a), 11(2) (the Legal Contribution Trust).
29 LPA 1996 (Vic) sI81(1)(a) (the Legal Practice Board).
30 LPA 2004 (Qld) s208(2); Legal Profession Regul;tion 2004 (Qld) s4.
31 LPA 1987 (NSW) s65(1)(a); LPA 1996 (Vic) sI81(1)(a).
32 'Trust' is llsedin LPA 1974 (NT) ss79A(4), 80(1)-(3);LPA 1993 (Tas)ss96(1)(a), 98(1); Legal
Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) ss4, 6(l)(a), 11(2). See aisoLPA 2004 (Qld) s208(5).
solicitors and client, so far as the money kept in the SDA is concerned, into a sub-
trust. 33 Given that the statutory deposit is ofmixed trust money held for a range of
clients, it would be difficult to establish a trust relationship directly between the
IOLTA Trustee and the client. Furthermore, it is likely that the head trust and the
sub-trust are of different character. Even though the lodging solicitors retain
effective control over the statutory deposit by being able to recall it on demand,34
the IOLTA Trustee usually has some responsibility to invest the money pooled in
an SDA.35 It therefore has more active responsibilities in relation to the trust
capital than do the solicitors,36 who must only move money at the client's behest
and would normally be only bare trustees. 37
The statutory deposits scheme was first proposed in 1963 by the Law Institute
of Victoria to offset a potential depletion of the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund after a
series of major defalcations, and legislation gave it effect in Victoria in 1964.38
The other states followed over the next decade, but with broader funding purposes,
and especially legal aid, in mind. After two years of volleying between the state
government and the Queensland Law Society over control of solicitors'trust
accounts, Queensland adopted the Victorian scheme in 1965 as a means offunding
legal aid tvithout having to commit consolidated revenue.39 NSW and Vy'estern
Australia (WA) adopted the scheme in 1967,40 South Australia (SA) in 1969,41 and
Tasmania in 1970.42 The scheme was brought into the ACT in 1970, and the NT
in 1974.43




33 Austin Scott, The Law of Trusts Vol I (3'd ed, 1967) at 706-707. Compare Washington Legal
Foundation v Massachusetts Bar Foundation 993 F 2d 962 (1993), 974 (Bownes SCJ), although
the refusal to recognise a trust in this decision is now open to question: James Anderson, 'The
Future of IOLTA: ..Solutions to Fifth Amendment Takings Challenges Against IOLTA
Programs' [1999] University ofIllinois LR 717 at 742.
34 LPA 1970 (ACT) sI24(1); LPA 1987 (NSW) s65(1)(b); LPA 1974 (NT) s81(1); LPA 1996 (Vic)
sI81(1)(b); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) s 12(1). Compare LPA 1981 (SA) 554(9);
LPA 1993 (Tas) sI03(1).
35 LPA 1970 (ACT) ssI28(1), (4); LPA 1987 (NSW) ss65(3), 69B(2)(b); LPA 1974 (NT) ss79D,
84A(I), (4)--(5); LPA 1995 (Qld) s551(8)--(9); LPA 1981 (SA) s556(1)--(6); LPA 1993 (Tas)
5599(1), (2)(b); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) ss13, 14(2)--(6).
36 Gino Dal Pont & Donald Chalmers, Equity and Trusts in Australia (3rd eli, 2004) at 603.
37 Target Holdings Ltd v Redfems (afirm) [1996] 1 AC 421 at 436 (Browne-Wilkinson L1).
38 Principle and Pragmatism, above n6 at 95~98; John A Dawson, 'The Solicitors' Guarantee
Fund' (1975) 49 Law Inst J 16 at 17; Legal Profession Practice (Amendment) Act 1964 (Vic) s6.
39 Gregory, above n1 at 173-176; Legal Assistance Act 1965 (Qld) sI0(2).
40 William Stevenson, 'The Legal Practitioners Act: Proposed Amendments and Legal Aid
Proposals' (1967) 5(1) Law Society Journal 16 at 17-18; Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Act
1967 (NSW) s7; Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) s11(2).
41 Legal Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1969 (SA) s8.
42 LPA 1970 (Tas) s4.
43 Legal Practitioners Ordinance 1970 (ACT) s93; Legal Practitioners Ordinance 1974 (NT) s80.
The Legal Practitioners Ordinance 1969 (ACT) would have introduced the scheme in the ACT
a year earlier. However, this Ordinance was disallowed by the Senate, whicb objected to its
provision for a divided legal profession in the Territory: Commonwealth of Australia, Senate,
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 22 May 1969 at 1493-1519.
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The calculation of the amounts that solicitors must keep in an SDA is
undoubtedly the most bewildering aspect of this scheme. Its basic assumption is
that, despite the cash flows in and out of the trust account, the balance generally
never drops below a given amount: the 'hard core' of the trust account.44 The
'core' is deemed to be a base amount that solicitors are to lodge in the SDA, and
which usually must be adjusted every fmancial period. In all cases, the calculation
is made by reference to the total amount (barring amounts of controlled money)
held by the solicitors in trust for clients. Accordingly, the calculation is based on
the total amount that the solicitors hold in the trust account together with any
amount they might already have in an SDA.45 It is the lowest balance of this trust
money in a given financial period that governs the amount to be paid into the SDA.
And, solicitors usually need not lodge the statutory deposit where the lowest
amount held in trust, along with the amount kept in the SDA, has not reached a
prescribed threshold. These range from $500 to $15000.46 The original ViCtorian
scheme began with a requirement to lodge one-third of the lowest balance.4?
However, both the desire to maximise revenue, and the need to maintaiii dollar
returns ori'IOLTA against the 1990s drop in interest rates, have driven moves to
increase the holdings in SDAs. As a result, the proportions of trust balances to be
lodged as statutory deposits have risen steadily,48 bringing the statutory deposit
away from the trust account's 'core'.
As mentioned, controlled money held exclusively for one client is not counted
when calculating the statutory deposit.49 The interest it earns is already, on the
client's direction, dedicated to the client's private use. The SA Act also discounts
money received by solicitors for mortgage fmancing, even when that money is
held in the trust account.50 A general overview of the different method~.Qf ..
calculating statUtory deposits across Australia is given in Tabl~ i. .
44 Vernon Wilcox,· Victoria, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1
December 1963 at 1995-1996; Rupert Hamer, Victoria, Legislative Council, Parliamentary
Debl}tes (Hansard), 8 December 1963 at 2290.
45 If, as is common, the solicitors have more than one general trust account, then the aggregate
balance of all trust accounts held by the fum enters the calculation: LPA 1970 (ACT) sI22(5);
LPA 1974 (NT) s79(5); LPA 1995 (Qld) s51(2); Legal Profession Regulation 2004 (Qld) s7;
LPA 1981 (SA) s53(3); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) sll(2).
46 LPA 1970 (ACT) ssI23(1)--(2); Legal Profession Regulation 2002 (NSW) r130(4); LPA 1974
(NT) ss80(1)-{2); LPA 1995 (Qld) s51(13); Legal Profession Regulation 2004 (Qld) s8(5); LPA
1981 (SA) s53(4)(b); LPA 1993 (Tas) sI02(5); LPA 1996 (Vic) sI79(2); Legal Contributio,:
Trust Act 1967 (WA) sl1(3),
47 Legal Profession Practice (Amendment) Act 1964 (Vic) s6.
48 Principle and Pragmatism, above n6 at 132-134. Compare 'Solicitors Express Concern Over
New Statutory Deposit Regulation' (1995) 33(5) Law Society Journal 82.
49 LPA 1970 (ACT) sI22(8);LPA 1987 (NSW) s64(3)(a);LPA 1974 (NT) s79(8); LPA 1995 (Qld)
s51(2)(a); Legal Profession Regulation 2004 (Qld) s5(2); LPA 1981 (SA) s53(3); LPA 1996
(Vic) ssI79(5), 180(3); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) s4. Compare LPA 1993 (Tas)
sI01(5).
50 LPA 1981 (SA) s5(1).
';1
Low cash levels in the trust account usually allow adjustments to be made to
the base statutory deposit. Under the WA and Queensland rules, even with nothing
left in the trust account, these adjustments need not be made. Where, because some
trust money is in the SDA, the trust account balance itself is not sufficient to make
client payments, solicitors can overdraw the trust account up to an amount equal
to the statutory deposit. 51 Banks do mistakenly dishonour cheques, and a trust
account cheque that bounces is a trigger for an investigation of the law finn. 52
Even with the option of overdrawing the trust account, the safer approach is
therefore first to liquefy the trust account with money from the SDA.53 However,
in WA, overdrawing the trust account is the only lawful means by which solicitors
can make payments when the account's balance is nmning down.54 In all other
states, the governing Acts allow lesser amounts to be held in the SDA if, when
approaching the adjustment date, the balance of the solicitors' trust account would
not allow the statutory deposit to be paid in full, or when, through the financial
period, client payments carniot be made without overdrawing the trust account.55
The allowable adjustments to the statutory deposit are set out in Table 2.
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51 Legal Contribution Regulations 1968 (WA) rr7-8; Trost 4qgwnts.tkt 1973 (Qld) s27(2); '''The
Legal Assistance Actof 1965" - Practitioners' Trust Account Deposits' (1968) 42 Lcrr.' Inst J
436. Victoria's Law Institute Journal also served as the professional magazine for the
Queensland Law Society at this time. Compare Legal Profession Regulation 2004 (Qld)
s9(4)(a).
52 Legal Profession Regulation 2002 (NSW) r132; Queensland Law Society Rule 1987 (Qld) r92;
LPA 1996 (Vic) s189.
53 Stevenson, above n40 at 18-19; A S Furze, 'Calculating the Statutory Deposit with the Law
Institute' (1981) 55 Law Inst J 124; Tom Walsh, 'Statutory Deposit Section 42A' (1984) 22(4)
Law Society Journal 230 at 231. Sec also 'Calculating Statutory Deposit~' (1992) 30(2) Law
Society Journal 24 at 27.
54 Notice must also be given to the Legal Contribution Trust (the WA IOLTA Trustee) of an
overdrawing: Legal Contribution Regulations 1968 (WA) rr7-8. It would be expected that
solicitors' compliance with that protocol should, at an early stage, preclude an investigation that
might otherwise follow from an erroneous dishonouring of the trust account cheque.
55 In almost all cases; once the conditions for holding a lesser sum are met, the statutory deposit
may be maintained at that lower amount for the rest of the financial period. Under the old
Queensland rules, the solicitors must replenish the SDA once total trust moneys held have again
stabilised at a point above the previous year's lowest level, for instance when for 30 consecutive
days, two-thirds of the combined trust and SDA balance is at least equal to the base statutory
deposit: LPA 1995 (Qld) s51(5); Legal Profession Regulation 2004 (Qld) s9(3).
Table 1: Base Statutory Deposit
Formula - Statutory Deposit Financial Period Adjustment Date Threshold'
ACT:LPA 1970 2/3 (lowest aggregate trust account balance in previous lApril-31 March pr.eceding 30 June: ss123(2)- $3000: ssI23(1)-
financial period + amourit held in SDA on that ~ay): adjustment date: s86 (3) (2)
ssI22(2), 123(2)-(3) !
NSW: Legal Profession Regulation Lowest aggregate trust account balance in previpus 1 April-31 March preceding 20 banking days 1$10000: rl30(4)
2002 .financial period + amount held in SDA on that 4ay: rl30(1) adjustment date: rl29(2) after 1 April:
I rl31 (I)
NT:LPA 1974 Yo (lowest aggregate trust account balance in prdvious 1 July-30 June preceding adjustment 30 September: $3000: ss80(l )-(2)
financial period +amount held in SDA on that day): ss79(2). date: s53 ss80(2)-(3)
80(2)-(3)
Qld: Legal Profession Regulation 2/3 (lowest aggregate trust account balance in previous I January-31 December preceding 21 January: slO $3000: s8(5)
2004" financial period +amount held in SDA on that day): s8(2) adjustment date: s8(2)
SA: LPA 1981 Lowest aggregate trust account balance in previous Two six month periods: I December- 14 June and 14 $1000: s53(4)(b)
financial period + amount held in SDA on that day: s53(la) 31 May and I June-30 November: December: s53(1)
s53(1 )
Tns: LPA 1993 2/3 (lowest aggregate trust account balance in previous ' Four three month periods every year, 21 days after the $15000: s102(5)
financial period + amount held in SDA on last day of ending on 31 March. 30 June, 30 end of the
financial period): ss94, 102(1) September and 31 December: 5102(1) financial period
Vic: LPA 1996 72% (lowest aggregate trust account balance in current or 1 November-31 October: 53 7 November: First deposit:
previous financial period + amount held in SDA on that sI79(2) - out for $4166.67:
day): ssI79(3), 180(1) , first deposit only. s179(2).;
Subsequent
, I deposits: niL
WA: Legal Contribution Trust Act 65% (lowest aggregate trust account balance in current or Two six month:periods: I July-31 No adjustment $500: s 1l(3)
1967, Legal Contribution Trust previous financial period + amount held in SDA on that December and 1 January-30 June: s4 date specified. ,
Regulations 1968 day): sll(2), r3 ,






:Formula When Adjustment Allowed
ACT: LPA 1970 Amount approved by Law Application by solicitors, with
Society: s126(1) proof of insufficient funds to
maintain statutory deposit:
s126(1)
NSW: Legal Profession EITHER: lowest aggregate Withdrawal from SDA: r130(3)
Regulation 2002 trUst account balance in 15
banking days from a with-
drawal from the SDA + amount
held in SDA on that day; OR
amount approved by Law Soci-
ety: rr130(3), (6)
NT: LPA 1974 Amount approved by Trust Application by solicitors, with
Committee: s83(1) proof of insufficient funds to
maintain statutory deposit:
s83(1)
Qld: Legal Profession L~sser amount allowed, but no Withdrawal allowed to keep
Regulation 2004 formula: s9 trust account in credit: s9(1)
SA:LPA 1981 Lesser amount allowed, but no Withholding money or with·
formula. Auditor must give an drawal from SDA, notified to
opinion as to whether the Law Society: ss53(4)(a), (9)
amount withheld or withdrawn
from the SDA was the mini-
mum necessary to meet client
commitments: ss53(4a), (9),
(10)
Tas: LPA 1993 2/3 (lowest 'aggregate trust No special requirements for
account balance in fmancial mid-period adjustments.
period + amount held inSDA
on last day offinancial period):
ss94, 102(1)
Vic: LPA 1996 72% (lowest aggregate trust No special requirements for
account balance in current or mid-period adjustments.
previous financial period +
amount held in SDA on that
day): s180(1)
WA No variation permitted. Not applicable
Table 2: Adjusted Statuto(y Deposit
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'.''.
* The old Queensland rules set out in the LPA 1995 (Qld) s51 held until 30 June 2004, and require4
the adjusted amount to be 2/3 (lowest aggregate trust account balance mprevious 30 days +
amount held in SDA on that day). Table 2 only states the usual position when an adjustment is
made. It does not exhaust all variations possible in any given state, and does not include details of
adjustments to be made when a firm cannot lodge the statutory amount on the adjustment date.
For an inability to lodge a deposit on the adjustment date, see LPA 1970 (ACT) s125; Legal
Profession Regulation 2002 (NSW) r130(2); LPA 1974 (NT) s82; LPA 1995 (Qld) s51(5); LPA
1981 (SA) s53(4)(a).
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The statutory deposits schemes are largely self-regulated. IOLTA Trustees
generally have few rights or obligations in relation to the pooled amounts held in
the SDAs. Money held in the SDAs is repayable to lodging solicitors on demand,
and whether the solicitors are withdrawing money from an SDA in accordance
with the terms of the governing Act is, at least until they are audited, a question
which is for the solicitors themselves to judge. Accordingly, the only practical
obligation on the IOLTA Trustee, which is otherwise under a duty to invest the
money held in its SDAs, is to ensure that each SDA has a sufficient cash balance
to allow solicitors to make legitimate withdrawals from the account when an
adjustment to the statutory deposit is required. For solicitors, nevertheless,the
management of the responsibility to keep the statutory deposit at the prescribed
amount can be difficult. The requirements of the governing Acts or regulators are
complicated, and at times involve either impracticalities,56 unnecessary
nitpicking,57 or vagaries.58 While most law societies provide solicitors with
information on how to deal with statutory deposits, only the NSW Law~ociety
provides its members with an accessible electronic calculator that determines the
statutory deposit for them.59 .
To a small extent, the problems of interpretation associated with these schemes
stem from the drafters' reluctance to use algebra in the legislation - ~eading to
linguistic ~onvolutions. However, the root cause of the complexity ofthe statutory
deposits schemes remains the tension between government's and the profession's
interest in maximising the capital held in interest-generating SDAs and the
solicitors' convenience in being able to make payments for client business. As will
be explained in greater depth in Part 4, the money in the SDAs remains client
property,an~so' solicitors' access' as agents and trustees for the client has
effectively been given priority. But, except in WA, this comes at the administrative
cost of ensuring that a correctly calculated adjustment is made and, again, as much
as possible is left in the SDA.
56 For example, see Letter to the Editor, 'Statutory Deposit' (1980) 18 Law Society Journal 138;
BAH Gunness, 'Statutory Deposits' (1980) 18 Law SocietyJournal 183; Mikelis Strikis,
'Statutory Deposit' (1980) 18 Law Society Journal 245 at 246; 'Section 42A Adjustment in
April 1985' (1984) 22(10) Law Society Journal 715; 'Combined Trust Account - Amendment
to Dates' (1988) 10 Law Society Bulletin 61 at 62; 'Solicitors Express Concern Over New
Statutory Deposit Regulation' (1995) 33(5) Law SocietY Journal 82; 'Interest on" Trust
Accounts' (1972) 2 Q Law Soc J 137 at 138; Gregory, above nl at 18~181.
57 See, for example, the accounting quibbles in 'Solicitor's Deposit with the Law Institute' (1977)
51 Law Inst J7; Boone, above n4 at 544.
58 See, for example, 'The Legal Assistance Act of 1965 and the Regulations Thereunder' (1969)
43 Law Inst J 99; 'Calculation of Statutory Deposits - Section 42A' (1983) 21 Law Society
Journal 468; Victorian Legal Pmctice Board, Annual Report 2002 (2002) at 12.
59 Law Society of NSW, 'Statutory Deposit Calculator': <http://laws.lawsociety.com.auJprofreg/
stat_dep_calculatorl> (11 April 2005). The SA Law Society sells a software package that
calculates the statutory deposit, and that signals the need for any adjustments.
The solicitors' management of their statutory deposit obligations is
independently reviewed in all states when the management of the trust account is
audited or inspected.60 In some states, a breach of the terms of the governing Acts
technically exposes the solicitors to criminal sanctions.61 Furthermore, there is
potential civil liability. In SA, failure to maintain the statutory deposit at the
prescribed level for the correct periods makes the solicitors liable to reimburse the
SDA, with interest, to compensate for any losses the IOLTA Trustee might have
suffered as a consequence of the solicitors' failure to maintain the correct
deposit.62 Although there is no statutory power to recover unpaid statutory
deposits in the other states, the IOLTA Trustee may be able to invoke its general
duty to take possession of its entrusted property, as a means of recovering either
statutory deposits that remain unpaid or interest on late payments.63 However, the
only documented evidence of IOLTA Trustees taking an active role in trying to
recover statutory deposits is in reported law society threats of discipline against
non-complying solicitors, and discipline exercised for failing to obtain audit
certification that statutory deposit obligations have been satisfied.64 Some states,
such as Victoria, appear to have no sanctions for failure to comply with statutory
deposits obligations. .
"
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D. Interest on Residual Balances: Westpac Funds "
1 ,i.:r'.;:
A more direct means of acquiring IOLTA for public use is by payment of any
interest earned on solicitors' trust accounts to the IOLTA Trustee. Although the
ban on crediting interest to current accounts was lifted with the deregulation of
banking in 1984,65 the practice of not crediting interest to solicitors' trust accounts
has generally remained unchanged. However, in all states but SA, the law society,
a professional regulator or government can make an arrangement with banks and
60 LPA 1970 (ACT) ss101(1), 104(2)(b); Legal Profession Regulation 2002 (NSW) r94;LPA 1974
(NT) s67; Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) s16; Legal Profession Regulation 2004 (Q1d) s12; LPA
1981 (SA) s33;LPA 1996 (Vic) s183;LPA 1893 (WA) s42A(1). There are no audilrt:quirements
in Tasmania, but inspections are conducted: LPA 1993 (Tas) s121. Forreminders that a qualified
audit certificate follows from non-compliance with the statutory deposit requirements, see
'Interest on Trost Accounts' [1972] Law Society Bulletin 2, republished: [1973] Law Society
Bulletin 1; [1974] Law Society Bulletin 4. See also S P McNamara, 'Trost Accounting' (1985)
7 Law Society Bulletin 341; J A Whyte, 'The Combined Trust Account' (1986) 8 Law Society
Bulletin 351: republished (1987) 9 Law Society Bulletin 326.
61 LPA 1974 (NT) s138A; LPA 1995 (Q1d) ss54(1), 55; LPA 1981 (SA) s53(4)(b); Legal
Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) ssll(5), 54. .
62 LPA 1981 (SA) ss53(8), (11).
63 Grove v Price (1858) 26 Beav 103 at 104; 53 ER 836 at 836; Westmoreland v Holland (1871)
23 LT 797; Re Pilling; Ex parte Ogle (1873) 8 Ch App 711 at 717;'Field v Field [1894] 1 Ch
~~~ .
64 Q1d: Re Zaghini (1996) 26 QLaw Soc J 612; Re a Practitioner, SCT/38G (1996) 26 Q Law Soc
J 616; Re Cremin (1997) 2 BRDA 2; Re X, SCT/15 (1999) 5 BRDA 2 al4. SA: 'Interest on Trust
Accounts' [1977] Law Society Bulletin 2. Vic: 'StatutoryDeposits with the lnstitute' (1976) 50
Law Inst J73 at 74; 'Statutory Deposit with Institute' (1978) 52 Law Inst J76. .
65 Banking (Savings Banks) Regulation (Amendment) 1984 (Cth) r5. See LPA 1970 (ACT) s74;
LPA 1987 (NSW) s64(5); LPA 1974 (NT) s45(2)(a)(i); LPA 1996 (Vic) s137; LPA 1893 (WA)
s28A(1). .
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other flllancial institutions by which amounts are calculated as ifthey were interest
earned on the residual balances of solicitors' trust accounts. Those amounts are
then paid to an IOLTA Trustee.66 The remitted money goes into the Trustee's
public funds,67 and so adds to the capital from which it earns income for public
programs.
This scheme originated in 1979 in a proposal of the Law Institute of Victoria
(hereafter 'the Institute') to its state government that interest be paid on the
balances of money held in solicitors' trust accounts that had not been lodged with
an SDA. The Institute's position was that, if interest were to accrue on these
balances and be remitted to the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund (the then IOLTA
Trustee), another $12 million would be available for legal aid in Victoria and the
statutory deposits scheme would become redundant. 68 That was soon diluted. To
a joint Institute and government .committee chaired by Solicitor-General Daryl
Dawson, the Australian Banking Association was said to have objected t9.t4e
Institute's original plan on the ground that the accrual of interest on trustaccounts
would 'be unhistorical, immoral and .. : impossible to calculate' .69 The profession
itself recognised that, once interest was credited to trust accounts, it would have to
be paid to the clients. Accordingly, the banks' position in refusing to pay interest
on trust accounts was accepted. However, a fiction was adopted by which banks
would make ex gratia payments, calculated by reference to trust account balances,
to the Guarantee Fund.70 The first bank to make these payments was Westpac, and
the money is still called 'Westpac funds' (regardless of its source) in some legal
circles.71 As the banks' payments were made voluntarily, thi~ calculatio~ was
made on the basis of rates well below those applicable to the SDAs. Therefore,' if
revenue was to be maximised, the statutory deposits scheme had to be retained.
The Institute, neyertbeless, progressively negotiated higher relative rates72 until,
in 1993, its bargaining power was strengthened by a prohibition on banks offering
trust account facilities to solicitors unless the banks had agreed to make these
payments to the Guarantee Fund.73 In 1996, the Institute's role in this scheme was
given to the Legal Practice Board. Westpac funds were soon paid throughout the
66 LPA 1970 (ACT) s129(1); LPA 1987 (NSW) s69E(1); Law Society Public Purposes Trust Act
1988 (NT) s3(1); Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Q1d) s36C(b); LPA 2004 (Q1d) s202(b);
LPA 1993 (Tas) sI04(1); LPA 1996 (Vic) ssI76(1)-{2); Law Society Public Purposes Trust Act
1985 (WA) s3(1).
67 LPA 1970 (ACT) sI29(2); LPA 1987 (NSW) ss69B(2)(b), 69E(2); Law Society Public Purposes
Trust Act 1988 (NT) s3(2); Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s36C(b); LPA 1993 (Tas)
s105; LPA 1996 (Vic) sI76(3); Law Society Public Purposes Trust Act 1985 (WA) s3(2).
68 'Interest Sought for Trust Accounts' (1979) 53 faw 1nst J 403.
69 Robert Cornall, 'Considerable Sums o(Money: A Short History of the Solicitors' Guarantee
Fund' (1995) 69 Law 1nst J 12 at 13; Solicitors Guarantee Fund, above n6 at 61.
70 Cornall, id at 13; 'Bank Interest on Trust Accounts is Benefit for All' (1983) 57 Law 1nstJ248.
71 Evan Walker, Victoria, Legislative Co~cil, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 14 June 1983
at 2737.
72 Evans, Principle andPragmatism, above n6 at 132,.136; 'Interest on Trust Accounts' (1986) 60
Law 1nst J519. .
73 Evans, Principle and Pragmatism, above. n6 ilt 136; Cornall, above n69 at 13; Legal Profession
Practice (Guarantee Fund) Act 1993 (Vic) s7.
E. Efficiency and Effectiveness: A Sketch
IOLTA schemes do not create value, or make client money more productive. This
claim has been made in American litigation on IOLTA schemes,83 but is inaccurate
economics. IOLTA schemes redistribute the income earned on client money. If
client money is banked, but in a trust account that is credited no interest, it 'is a~
country,74 and legislation validating this came in the ACT in 1983,75 in
Queensland and WA in 1985,76 in the NT in 1988,77 and in Tasmania in 1990.78
Although banks began to remit payments based on residual balances of trust
accounts to the NSW Law Society in 1983, validating legislation was not passed
until 1998.79 ,
The SA scheme is slightly different. III 1978, the State Attorney-General, Peter
Duncan, proposed that solicitors be limited to holding their trust accounts at
government-approved banks that would credit interest to them, but also remit the
interest to a regulator to help fund legal aid. There were objections within the
profession that this would limit practitioners' freedom to choose their banks. It was
also claimed that the personal sweeteners that banks offered to attract solicitors'
business (which would not be available without solicitors' ability to choose a
bank) reduced the overheads of legal practice and, so, the cost of professional
representation.80 The proposal 'was only abandoned temporarily, and was
implemented in full in 1985.81 In SA, the remission of interest earned on residual
balances does not therefore depend on the law society striking an agreement with
the banks. The Legal Practitioners Act puts a direct obligation on' the banks to pay
the SA Law 'Society interest accruing on the balances left in solicitors' . trust'
accounts, and those accounts must be held at government-approved banks or
fmahcial institutions.82
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74 See, for example, comments in Neil Bell, Northern Territory Legislative Assembly,
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 25 May 1988 at 3356; Gregory Crafter, South Australia,
House ofAssembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 14 February 1985 at 2548.
75 Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Ordinance (No 2) 1983 (ACT) s5 .
. 76 Queensland Law Society Act Amendment Act 1985 (Qld) s28; Law Society Public Purposes
Trust Act 1985 (WA) s2 (sch).
77 Law Society Public Purposes Trust Act 1988 (NT) s2 (sch).
78 Legal Practitioners Amendment Act 1990 (Tas) s5.
79 New South Wales Law Refonn Commission, Fourth Report on the Legal Profession -
So'licitors' Trust Accounts Report No 44 (1984) at 26: 'Interest on Statutory Deposits and Trust
Funds' (1988) 16(10) Law Society Journal 11 at 12; Jeffrey Shaw, Attorney-General, New
South Wales, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 21 October 1998 at
8695-8696; Legal Profession Amendment Act 1998 (NSW) s3 (sch I [10]).
80 'Trust Fund Changes Opposed' [1978] Law Society Bulletin 1; Gregory Crafter, above n74 at
2548; id at 20 February 1985 at 2707.
81 Legal Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1985 (SA) sl!.
82 LPA 1981 (SA) s57A(l).
83 'The program creates income where there was none before': Paulsen v State Bar of Texas 55
SW 3d 39 (2001), 44 (Kidd J) (hereafter Paulsen). See also the argument ofthe US Government
in Phillips v Washington Legal Foundation 524 US 156 (1998), 170 (hereafter Phillips);
Michael Heller & James Krier, 'Deterrence and Distribution in the Law ofTakings' (1999) 112
HarvLR 997 at 1019.
''1/.,.
..~ .;
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generally productive as if in an interest-bearing savings account. That productivity
is wholly represented by the bank's profit-margin on re-lending, which is higher
than it is for deposits in savings accounts to the extent that the bank does not incur
interest costs to the depositors.84 The IOLTA scheme therefore does not create
value from 'sterile' money in the trust account.85 Rather, it shifts value from the
banks' shareholders to the public programs designated by the scheme.86 Thus, the
banking policy and the nature of the scheme raise the question of where the value
earned on trust account deposits is to fall; a question of distributive justice that
bears further consideration when the moral claims that should - but do not -
coordinate the structure ofIOLTA schemes are considered later.
The earlier outline of IOLTA in Australia plainly suggests that administrative
costs would be reduced if statutory deposits schemes were discontinued, and bank
payments to IOLTA Trustees made by reference to total trust account deposits. The
NZ and various US IOLTA schemes adopt this pattern - the latter only differ in the
extent to which law firms are compelled to participate in them. An alternative is
the Canadian scheme of having the banks credit interest to an amount equivalent
to the statutory deposit, but that is retained in the trust account without a separate
deposit being.made in the SDA.87 In Australia, either approach would save
; solicitors having to calculate statutory deposits, constantly monitor overall trust
account balances and pay money into and withdraw it from the SDA, alongside the
additional audit costs incurred to review compliance. However, the simplification
ofIOLTA in Australia is unlikely while the ability of each scheme to redistribute
the wealth generated by trust account deposits differs so markedly. Even a cursory
glance at Table 3 suggests that residual balances schemes actually raise more than
twice the amounts that statutory deposits schemes can, and have enhanced IOLTA
significantly. However, with a deregulated banking sector, government probably
has the ability to disgorge a greater share of the value earned on trust account
deposits under the statutory deposits scheme than it can through a residual
balances scheme. Information available on SDA balances and rates of return is
poor, and on the residual balances schemes it is worse. But enough is available to
indicate that in recent years SDAs have earned up to 5 per cent in interest and the
invested funds from SDAs even more.88 Although calculated on larger amounts of
84 See Brown, above n7 at 257 (Lord Reid).
85 Compare Anderson, above n33 at 744-745; Phillips, above n83 at 181 (Breyer 1).
86 Dulong, above n4 at 123; Heller & Krier, above n83 at 1020. 'In practice, IOLTA took from the
banks and gave to the poor': Paulsen, above n83 at 48 (Kidd 1).
87 Law Practitioners Act 1982 (NZ) ss91A-91N; Boone, above n4 at 546-547; Brent Salmons,
'IOLTAs: Good Work or Good Riddance' (1998) 11 Georgetown Journal ofLegal Ethics 259
at 262-263.
88 Law Society of the ACT, Annual Report 2002 (2002) at 25: Statutory Interest Account Financial
Report - 30 June 2002 at 7; Annual Report 2003 (2003) at 25: Statutory Interest Account
Financial Report - 30 June 2003 at 7; NT Legal Practitioners' Trust Committee, Special
Purpose Financial Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2001 (2001) at 5, 6; Audited Special
Purpose Financial Report - Year Ended 30 June 2002 (2002) at 7, provided by NT Legal
Practitioners' Trust Committee, Letter to Author, 14 October 2003; WA Legal Contribution
Trust, Annual Report 30 June 2002 (2002) at 8, 9; Financial Report for the Six Months Ended
30 June 2003 (2003) at 9.
89 Principle and Pragmatism, above 06 at 132; Heller & Krier, above 083 at 1019-1020.
90 See 4B.
trust capital, the rates of return to public programs under the residual balances
schemes are probably much lower. First, the' payments are usually still made ex
gratia, even if some states have strengthened the incentives for banks' to participate
in the residual deposits schemes by baiming solicitors from holding trust accounts
with non-participating banks. Secondly,at best, the banks are only likely to
calculate the payments to be made to IOLTA Trustees at rates applicable to current
accounts. Since deregulation, banks have responded to competition and demand by
crediting interest to some brands of curn~nt account, but at rates well below those
applied to savings accounts. The notional rates applied to trust accounts are
unlikely to be above those applied to current accounts. Thirdly, the SDAs represent
pools of money that dwarf the separate balances of trust accounts on which
residual balances calculations are made. The p.igher balances made possible by
pooling also mean that higher interest rates are applied to SDAs, with more
effective redistribution ofvalue from the banks to public programs.89 ,The rational
economic decision, for governments and professions, trying to maximise IOLTA
returns, is therefore to maintain the more effective statutory deposits schemes.
However, the self-regulation of the statutory deposits scheme means that its
costs, in time and effort, are largely borne by private practitioners. Its complexity,
requiring adjustments, adds to that cost, and creates some incentive for avoiding
the obligation to lodge a statutory deposit altogether. The thresholds listed in Table
I give an opportunity to do that. So long as the total amount held in the trust
account and the SDA is below the threshold on at least one day in the financial
period, there is no need to lodge a statutory deposit. That call be (and in practice
is) arranged, where the solicitors make a concerted effort to secUre investment
authorities for all money held in trust so that, for at least one day, almost all trust
money becomes controlled money and is disregarded when calculating whether to
lodge a statutory depo~!Lw;hU~, sup~rficially, th~t practice mights.eem devious, it
will be seen that it is actually more compatible with the solicitors' basic duty to act
in clients' interests.90 In any case, there is a strong argument for enhancing
solicitors' willingness to lodge client money in separate savings accounts wbef(~ it
can earn more for the client, and it would be preferable that they practised this
routinely.
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Table 3: Australian IOLTA Income (in $'OOOs), 2000-2003
2000-1 2001-2 ~ 2002-3
Statutory Residual Statutory Residual Statutory Residual
Deposits' Balances Total Deposits' Balances
...
Total Deposits' Balances Total
--
ACT" (%) 325 (31.9) 693 (68.1) I 018 (100) 276 (26.8) 752 (73.2) I 028 (100) 329 (24.6) 1 006 (75.4) 1 335 (100)
NSWb (%) 11 683 (32.7) 24023 (67.3) 35706 (100) 10 867 (30.9) '.24346 (69.1). 35213 (100) 13901 (31.4) 30353 (68.6) 44254 (100)
N'f' (%) 65 (26;6) 179 (73.4) 244 (l00) 52 (26.9) 141 (73.1) 193(100) 55 (25.7) 168 (75.3) 223 (100)
Qldd (%) 4809 (26.6) 13243 (73.4) 18052 (100) 3894 (24.4) 12067 (75.6) 15961 (100) 5 107 (23.4) 16713 (76.6) 21 820 (100)
SAe (%) 1 334 (43.9) 1706 (56.1) 3040 (100) 1 104 (37.8) 1 814 (62.2) 2918 (l00) 1 299 (39.8) 1961 (60.2) 3260 (l00)
Tasf (%) 659 (41.7) 921 (58.3) 1 580 (100) 666 (42.8) ~ 889 (57.2) 1 555 (l00) 771 (41.5) 1 088 (58.5) 1 859 (J 00)
l
Vicg (%) 10475 (33.6) 20727 (66.4) 31202 (100) 9699 (33.3) 19466 (66.7) 29165 (100) 13055.(37.0) 22201 (63.0) 35256 (l00)
WAh (%) 1004 (45) I 225 (55) 2229 (100) 853 (36.8) 1 465 (63.2) 2318 (100) 959 (39.1) 1 496 (60.9) 2455 (100)
Total Australia 30354 (32.6) 62717(67.4) 93071 (l00) 27 4 JI (31.0) 60940 (69.0) 88351 (l00) 35476 (32.1) 74986 (67.9) JlO 462 (100)
(%)
*) Amount listed may be the aggregate of interest earned on SDAs, and income on amounts from SDAs that have been invested. a) Law Society of the ACT, Annual Report 2001 (2001) at 29: Statutory
Interest A~count Financial Report (SIAFR) 30/6/01 at 5; Annual Report 2002 (2002) at 25: SIAFR 30/6/02 at 5; Annual Report 2003 (2003) at25: SIAFR 30/6/03 at 5. b) Law Society of NSW, Annual
Report 2001 (2001) at 89; Annual Report 2002 (2002) at 97; Annual Report 2003 (2003) at 105. c) NT Legal Practitioners' Trust Committee (NTLPTC), Special Purpose Financial Reportfor the Year
Ended 30 June 2001 (2001) at 4; Audited Special Purpose Financial Report - Year Ended 30 June 2002 (2002) at 3, provided by NTLPTC, Letter to Author, 14/10103. NTLPTC, Special Purpose
Financial Reportfor the Year Ended 30 June 2003 (2003) at 3; NT Law Society Public Purposes Trust, Annual Financial Report 30 June 200 (200 I) at 4; Financial Statements and Reports for the Year
Ended 30 June 2002 (2002) at 3; Financial Statements and Reports for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 (2003) at 2, provided by NT Law Society, Letter to Author, 11112/03. d) Queensland Law Society,
Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001) at 61; Annual Report 1001-2002 (2002) at 39, 66, 75; 75th AnnualReport 2002-2003 (2003) at 50,.79, 89; Legal Aid Queensland, AnniJal Report 2000-2001 (2001) at
61; Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002) at 65; Annual Report2002-io03 (2003) at 85.'TheQueensland Law Society did not report the total amount earned on statutory deposits, so the figures given have
been obtained by reconstruction of items reported for Legal Aid Queensland, the General Trust Accounts Contribution Fund and the Fidelity Guarantee Fund and assume that the governing Acts have
been followed. e) Law Society of SA, Annual Report 2001~2002'(2002)at 5, 11; Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) at 54, 60. f) Solicitors' Trust, Letter to Author, 15/3/04. The Tasmanian Solicitors'
Trust reports on a calendar year basis. The figures given for a financial year are estimated at half of the aggregate of the income for the two cale?dar years it spans. g) Victorian Legal Practice Board,
Annual Report 2001 (2001) at 31; Annual Report 2002 (2002) 'at 35; Annual Report 2003 (2004) at 42. h) Law Society ofWA, Public Purposes Trust FinancialStatements 30 June 2001 (2001) at 5;
Public Purposes Trust Financial Statements 30 June 2002 (2002) at 5; Public Purposes Trust Fin~n~ial Statements 30 June 2003 (2003) at 5; WA Legal Contribution Trust, Annual Report 30 June










IOLTA funds a range of programs, ,although all are related in one way or another
to the practice or administration oflaw. In all states, priority is given to the IOLTA
Trustee's costs ofadministering the scheme.91 After that, legal aid and the fidelity
funds - administrative arrangements for reimbursing those who lose money as a
result of a solicitor's defalcation92 - remain the major recipients of IOLTA. As
has been seen, the L.aw InstitUte of Victoria originally developed the statutory
deposits scheme to secure fmance for the Solicitors' Guarantee Fund, which was
at risk of depletion, arid a potential inability to meet claims, as a result of
defalcations by a number of Victorian finns in the early 1960s.93 'In the next ~tate
to introduce the scheme, Queensland, IOLTA was largely seen as a means of
supporting legal aid, and at no cost to the government. Indeed, the Queensland
Law Society paid legislated portions of interest on SDAs directly to the Legal
Assistance Fund, without government's mediation of the payments.94
There is also a range of public programs that can receive distributions,
including: copununity legal centres; university and community legal education;
practical legal training programs; continuing legal education for practitioners; law
refqrm; legal research; promotion of access to justice; legal profession regulation;
law society objections in admission proceedings; investigations into practitioners'
conduct and disciplinary proceedings; maintenance of law libraries; and
publication of legal works. The older legislation set defmed portions of income
from IOLTA funds that were to be directed to one end or another.95 More recently,
the IOLTA Trustee is nominally given some discretion as to how much money is
to be directed to any given program, but this is usually subject to government
dictation and control.96 In the NT, the IOLTA Trustees decide how to allocate
distributions without any necessary reference·togoveI111iJ.ent.
Table 4 summarises the legally directed distribution of IOLTA after
administrative costs are met, with the proportions specified where the goverlling
Act does so.
91 LPA 1970 (ACT)sI28(4)(j);LPA 1987 (NSW) s69F(I)(d);LPA 1974(NT)s84A(5);LPA 1995
(Qld) s51(9)(a); Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s36E(a); LPA 2004 (Qld) s209; LPA
1981 (SA) s56(4); LPA 1993 (Tas) s99(1); LPA 1996 (Vic) ss374(2)(a)(i), 376(2); Legal
Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) sI4(2)(a).
92 For details of fidelity funds, see Gino Dal Pont, Lawyers' Professional Responsibility in
Australia and New Zealand (2nd ed, 2001) at 259-260.
93 Dawson, above n38 at 17. ,. ".,.'
94 Gregory, above nl at 173-176; Legal Assistance Act 1965 (Qld) sI0(5). This position changes
under the LPA 2004 (Qld) s209.
95 LPA 1974 (NT) s84A; LPA 1995 (Qld) s51(9); Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s36E;
LPA 1981 (SA) s56(5); LPA 1993 (Tas) s99(2);Legal Contribution TrustAct 1967 (WA) sl4(3).
96 LPA 1970 (ACT) sI23(4); LPA 1987 (NSW) s691(1); LPA 2004 (Qld) ss209-21O; LPA 1996
(Vic) ss372-387. Compare Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld) s36E(b)(iii); LPA 1981
(SA) s56(6); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) sI4(3).
Table 4: Allocations of IOLTA Revenue*
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,e. ::I ::I
- .9 ~ § ..::I _ .s o ' ~ ~'Ol"O o .~ <;, ~ .... ":=l"O .~ 0.. ~~ Ul t5 "'..::I '" u0Il·~ .g § >-l "'<8 OIl" OIl '" '" .~~~ '" .~ ,,~ " .... 8~- u ~ -5- u p.. >-l~ ~ ~ ~ ~ii:~ 51 .:!l >-l.g ~>-l~Ci Ul- ~ p.. .~ >-. §<
Ul
ACT: LPA 1970 sI28(4) -.J '-.J -.J -.J -.J -.J X X -.J X X
NSW: LPA 1987 ss690, .691 v v v v v v v v X
NT - Statutory Deposits: LPA 100%, but discretion to apply to
1974 s84A -.J other programs if fund X .,j X X X -.J X X X
> $250 000
NT - Residual Balances: Law
Society Public Purposes Act X X X .,j .,j .,j X ...j .,j .,j X
1988
Qld - Statutory Deposits (to 50% + surplus above Up to an amount that will main- X X X X X X X X X
2004): LPA 1995 s51(9) fidelity fund allocation tain fund at $5 million
Qld - ResidualBalances (to
2004): Qfleensland Law 75% X 10% 5% 10%
SocietyAct 1952 s36E
Qld (from 2004): LPA 2004 v iV v X X X v v v v v
s209
SA - Statutory Deposits: LPA 62.5% + surplus above The lower of37.5% or an amount
1981 ss56(5)-(6) fidelity fund allocation that will maintain the fund at X X X X X X X X X
$7500 per practitioner
SA - Residual Balances: LPA 50% 40% 10%
1981 s57A(2)
Tas: LPA 1993 s99(2) X 100% X X X X X X X X X
Vic.: LPA 1996 ss372-387 Up to 30% v v v v Up to 15% v X
WA - Statutory Deposits: At least 50% of surplus Up to an amount that will main-
Legal Contribution Trust Act. above fidelity fund tain fund at $100 000 X .,j X X -.J .,j X X X
1967 ssI4(2)-(3) contribution
WA - Residual Balances: Law ,~
Society Public Purposes X X X X .,j X X .,j ...j .,j X
Trust Act 1985 s5
* For instance, after the costs of administering the schemes are met. The repealed Queensland rules are provided as the information in Tables 3 and 5 relates to money raised
under the schemes they governed. .,j =A potential funding program, but in discretionary amounts. X =Unable to receive 10LTA money in that state.
All of these programs, especially legal aid, benefit lawyers, even if others also
benefit,-and it will inevitably be debatable as to whether- tha( translates into a
program that serves the public good, or a private interest. However, I make no
attempt to nominate any program as more deserving of IOLTA than another.
Evans' work has revealed serious ethical problems with some law societies'
management of IOLTA money, including 'round robin' allocations to programs
that, in turn, allocate money to the law society, and piggy-backing law society
administration on a fidelity fund or regulatory administration that is IOLTA-
resourced. 97 It also appears that IOLTA money could have helped buy downtown
real estate as an investment for the profession.98 These need further investigation,
but my focus is on shortcomings that are prior to the ethics of allocation. Further
analysis of IOLTA allocations is therefore limited to legal aid, to show how
dependent governments and professions have become on IOLTA for a program of
benefit to both the public and lawyers.
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B. Legal Aid
Although the importance of IOLTA to the funding of legal aid in Australia has
occasionally Reen downplayed,99 Table 5 shows that around 10 per cent of all legal
aid funding nationally comes frpm IOLTA. Once account is taken of the limited
apRlication of federal legal aid funding to federal matters, it can be seen that
IOLTA provides between 15 and 20 per cent of funds for legal aid in state matters,
which include most criminal defence work and a range ofcivil claims in areas like
child protection, domestic violence, workers compensation, anti-discrimination
and consumer protection. IOLTA is therefore a significant support for legal aid
services, although its importance does differ from state to state. In Tasmania, legal
aid cannot receive anything from the IOLTA schemes. In the NT it can receive
money from the statutory deposits scheme but has received nothing in the last three
financial years, and in WAthe most that the law society directed to legal aid in that
time is around $150000. At the other extreme, Queensland, true to its original plan
for the statutory deposits scheme, is the most reliant on IOLTA for legal aid
funding. Since 1996, IOLTA schemes have sometimes provided more than 20 per
cent of the total Queensland legal aid budget and close to 40 per cent of the budget
that can be used for state matters. 100
97 Principle and Pragmatism, above 06 at 128-132; Solicitors Guarantee Fund, above 06 at 146,
148, 198, 230-232, 392-393_ Compare Rod Welford, Queensland, Legislative Assembly,
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 18 May 2004 at 1069-1070.
98 Compare Peter Patmore, Tasmania, House of Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 27
November 1990 at 5504; Doug Lowe, Tasmania, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates
(Hansard), 6 December 1990 at 4409.
99 Maria Imperial, 'A Global Forum on Access to Justice April 6-8, 2000: Transcript Roundtable:
Funding Strategies April 7, 2000' (2000) 24 Fordham International LJ 254 at 262.
100 Legal Aid Queensland, Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001) at 61. See the reports given for 1996-
1997 and 1999-2000: Australian National Legal Aid, 'Finance': <http://www.nla.aust.net.au/>
(11 April 2(05).
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b
Those states that distribute IOLTA to legal aid use it both to extend the budgets
of the legal aid commissions and reduce the appropriation from the states'
consolidated revenue for legal aid proirams. In the NT and Tasmania (in 200 I and
2002), two jurisdictions in which IOLTA either cannot be, orIs not, allocated to
legal aid, per capita funding of legal aid is above the national average (as shown
by comparing the amounts given to legal aid as a share of the national allocation
to the proportion of the national population in the jurisdiction). However, this is
largely because of disproportionate federal funding. The budgets for non-federal
matters are well below the national average. Unlike the other states, Tasmania does
not provide legal aid for any non-federal, civil law matters (apart from child
protection and de facto couple claims).101 In WA, where the IOLTA Trustee does
not allocate significant amounts to legal aid, per capita legal aid funding is less
than the national average. More than in any other state, legal aid in WA depends
on state govemment appropriations. Three states that deploy IOLTA for legal aid
are around or above the national average in the proportion oflegal aid budgets that
can be used in non-federal matters. NSW (in i002 and 2003), SA (In 2001 and
2002) a~d Queensland have per capita legal aid funding above the n~tiomil
average:'Victoria has a lower than average share of the national allo~ation to legal
aid, and this may be attributable to its smaller proportionate distribution ofIOLTA
to legal aid programs. Queensland again shows best how IOLTA can be used both
to extend the provision of legal aid but to reduce the burden this places on
taxpayers. Its per capita funding oflegal aid is slightly above the national average.
However, this is due entirely to a more marked commitment ofIOLTA, as the state
government appropriation to legal aid is amongst the lowest proportionate
commitments made in Australia.
But, whatever effect IOLTA schemes might have on legal aid budgets and state
appropriations-; they are nqw ensconced in-1:he funding structure of legal aid. In
1998, federal legal aid funds (which mainly support family law work) were cut by
just over $20 million nationally,102 causing great consternation in the legal aid
sector, the legal profession and the Family Court. The consequential rise in the
number ofunrepresented litigants in the Family Court led its Chief Justice, Alistair
Nicholson, to claim that the reduction in government funding had caused a crisis
in family law, and the Law Council ofAustralia shared this view. 103 Accordingly,
a loss ofIOLTA revenue, now more than $30 million annually, would have a major
detrimental effect on legal aid services in the states that are more dependent on it,
with cuts in assistance for state matters oflesser funding priority the most likely
consequence. Given the Dietrich104 obligations to provide a fair trial in criminal
cases the funding from non-federal sources must give priority to criminal defence
work, this raises the possibility of an increase in unrepresented litigants in most
civil matters that can currently receive legal aid.
101 Matter Type Guidelines, issued under the Legal Aid Commission Act 1990 (Tas) s27: <http://
www.1ega1aid_tas.gov.aulBusiness/Guide1ines/default.htm> (11 April 2005).
102 Australian National Legal Aid, 'Finance': <http"://www.nla.aust.net.auJ> (11 April 2005).
103 Family Court of Australia, Response of the Family Court ofAustralia to ALRC Discussion
Paper 62 EntitledReview ofthe Federal Civil JusticeSystem (1999) at 17,27-32; Law Council
of Australia, Law Council Supports Judge's LegalAid Comments, Asks Attorney for Further
Details on Federal Magistracy, Press Release (21 October 1998); Alistair Nicholson, 'Legal
Aid and a Fair Family Law Justice System', paper presented at the Legal Aid Forum Towards
2010, Canberra, 21 April1999.
104 !)ietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292_
Table 5: Legal Aid Funding Sources (in $'OOs), 2000-2003a
ACTh, NSWC NTd Qlde SAf Tasg Vich WAi Australia
% National Populationi 1.7 33.9 1.0 18.7 7.8 2.4 24.8 9.8 100 ~,
,.
..
2000-2001 IOLTA(%) 599 (9.8) 13674 (13.9) 0(0) 12 098 (20.8) 1785.(7.3) 0(0) 5800 (8.2) In(0.6) ;34 J07(11.5)·
Other Non- . 5520 (90.2)· 51 720 (52.4) 2428 (49.1) 22 508 (38.8) 13 175 (53.6) 3459 (42.3)" 37 134 (52.4) 14847 (60.9) 145716 '
Federal (%) (49.3)
Federal (%) 33301 (33.7) 2512 (50.9) 23458 (40.4) 9588 (39.1) 4727 (57.7) 27 870 (39.4) 9371 (38.5) 115902
(39.2)
Total (%) 6119 (100) 98695 (100) 4940 (100) 58064 (1 QO) 24548 (100) 8186 (1,00) 70804 (100) 24369 (100) 295725
. (100)
% National 2.1 33.4 1.7 19.6 8.3 2.8 23.9 8.2 100
Allocation
2001-2002 IOLTA(%) 637 (9.6) 13 839 (12.2) 0(0) 11 042 (17.9) 1449 (5.7) 0(0) 6555 (8.7) 0(0) 33522 (10:3)
Other Non- 5977 (90A)· 62 894 (55.6) 2834 (48.6) 24 906 (40.5) 13 779 (53.9) 3161(33.4) 41 148 (54.3) 15708 (59.7) 165317
Federal (%) (51.0)
Federal (%) 36 337 (32.1) 3002 (51.4) 25 606 (41.~) 10318 (40.4) 6298 (66,6) 28074 (37.0) 10616 (40.3) 125341
(38.7)









Table 5: Legal Aid Funding Sources (in $'OOOs), 2000-2003* cont.
~
ACTb NSWC Nrd Qlde .':SAf Tas8 Vicb WAi Australia
% National Populationi 1.7 33.9 1.0 Ip 7.8 2.4 24.8 9.8 100
2002-2003 IOLTA(%) 586 (8.1) 15965 (12.6) 0(0) 15255 (20.7) 2279 (8.6) 0(0) 7630 (9.6) 0(0) 41 715 (11.7)
Other Non- 6659 (91.9)" 72 043 (56.7) 2941 (54.7) 30 750 (41.8) 13 194 (50.1) 3476 (45.8) 44249 (55.5) 17564 (61.2) 190876 (53.7)
Federal (%)
Federal (%) 38956 (30.7) 2436 (45.3) 27 547 (37.5) 10884 (41.3) 4109 (54.2) 27 893 (34.9) 11 146 (38.8) 122971 (34.6)
Total (%) 7245 (100) 126964 (100) 5377 (100) 73552 (100) 26357 (100) 7585 (100) 79772 (100) 28710 (100) 355 562 (100)
% National' 2.0 35.7 1.5 20.7 7.4 2.1 22.4 8.1 100
Allocation ,.
. :. . ,
* The a6counts for the Leg~1 Aid Commi;sion (ACT) .do not distinguish between goveminent payments from-the Territory and Commonwealth Governments. a) Where there is a
discrepancy between the amounts recorded by the relevant legal aid commission and the state IOLTA Trustee, the legal aid commission's statements have been preferred. There are also
discrepancies between the actual income reported by legal aid commissions in their annual reports and the finance reports ofNational Legal Aid, a national forum for the commission
directors: compare Australian National Legal Aid, 'Finance': <http://www.nla.aust.net.aul> (II April 2005). b) Legal Aid Commission (ACT), Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001) at 39-
67; 25th Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002) at40, 47; Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) at 40. c) Law Society ofNSW, Ahmuil Report 2.001 (2001) at 89; Annual Report 2002 (2002) at 97;
Legal Aid NSW, Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002) at 38, 48; Annual Report 2002-2003 (2094) at 38, 48. d) NT Legal Aid Commission, Annual Report 2000-2001 (2002) at 34; Annual
Report 2001-2002 (2002) at 35,41; Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) at 37,43. e) Legal Aid Queensland, Annual Report 2000.2001 (2001) at 61 ~ Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002) at 65;
Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) at 85. 1) Law Society of SA, Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002) at 5,11; Legal Services Commission of SA, 23rd Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001) at 42,
49; 24th Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002) at 53, 59; 25th Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) at 57, 64. g) Legal Aid Coinrnission 'of Tasmania, Annual Report 2001 (2001): <http://
www.1egalaid.tas.gov.au/annualreport!Financial/> (II April 2005); Annualfieport 2002 (2002): <http://www.legalaid.tas.gov.au/Aiuiual%20Report%202002/> (II April 2005); Annual
Report 2003 (2003): <http://www.1egalaid.tas.gov.au/Publications/AnnuaIReport0203/> (11 April 2005). h) Victorian Legal ~taciic~·.Board;i20o.1 Annual Report (2001) at 31; Annual
Report 2002 (2002) at 35; Victoria Legal Aid, Sixth Statutory Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001) at 61, 64; Seventh Statutory Anhu~l R~port 200h2002 (2002) at41, 44; Eighth Statutory
Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003) at 51, 53. i) Legal Aid WA, Annual Report 2000-2001 (2001) at 84, 99; Legal Aid Commission qf, WA; i4'nniJal Report 2001-2002 (2002) at 86, 97;
Legal Aid WA, Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003): <http://www.1egalaid;wa;gov.au/AnnuaI/2002/ARFinance1.htm> (11 Apri12005).'j) AiistralianBureau of Statistics; 2003 Year Book
Australia, no 85 (Canberra: AGPS, 2003) at 113.
4. The Ethics ofIOLTA
The legal validity of Australian IOLTA schemes is not debatable. Since 1998,
when the NSW Parliament fInally passed a validating Act for.the state's residual
balances scheme, IOLTA in Australia has rested on a comprehensive platform of
state legislation. It will remain that way if the Model Laws on a National Legal
Profession are implemented. As such, it does not llave to meet any constitutional
requirements that compensation be provided to those who might have property
'taken' by government - unlike federal legislation that must give 'just terms' 105
or any US legislation that must (under the 'takings Clause') provide 'just
compensation' when 'private property' is 'taken for public use' .106 A
constitutio'nally directed compensation requirement might well be useful. It forces
goverinnent to satisfy itself that the economic benefIts of the scheme outweigh its
6osts,::and IJ1akes it easier to justify the scheme as being for the public benefIt. 107
However, the Australian people have voted not to extend the 'just terms'
requirements ofthe federal Constitution to the states. 108 As a consequence, IOLTA
schem"eS are not in Australia subject to the overarching 'takings' requirements that
they are "in the US, where there have been repeated takings clause challenges to the
validity ofIOLTA schemes since they were introduced in 1981.109
TIii~ is not to say that the IOLTA schemes, though legal, are ethical. To a
significant extent, an account of the public ethics ofIOLTA schemesis helped by
the judicial reasoning that identifIes where, if the schemes had not been
introduced, the revenue earned on trust account deposits would fall. In this sense,
then, the courts also model the public ethics that should shape the schemes, 110 but
which in Australia have been ignored completely.
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A. lnterest as Client Property
A traditional analysis of the trusts implicated in IOLTA schemes suggests that,
were it not for the Acts that redistribute value earned on trust account deposits, any
interest that a bank was prepared to credit to a trust account would belong to the
clients. No parliamentarian who has contributed to the debates about IOLTA h.as
expressed any doubt that a trust account deposit being used to earn revenue for
public programs was client money, and the structure of the legislative schemes that
have resulted both assumes, and reinforces, the character of the capital as trust
105 Commqnwealth ofAustralia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) s51(xxxi).
106 The Constitution ofthe United States, Fifth Amendment.
107 Heller & Krier, above n83 at 1001.
108 Constitution Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) 1988 (Cth) s3; compare Joseph Starke, 'The
Failure of the Bicentennial Referendum to Amend the Constitution, 3 September 1988' (1988)
62 AIJ976 at 977.
109 Boone, above n4 at 544; DeLaine, above n4 at 183. See Cone v State Bar ofFlorida 819 F 2d
"1002 (1987); Paulsen v Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation 23 SW 3d 42 (1999);
faulsen, above n83; Washington Legal Foundation v Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation
PO F 3d"180 (2001) (hereafter Washington Legal Foundation" [No 2])"
.110 This borrows the idea of a supreme court as an exemplar of public reason: see John Rawls,
- Political Liberalism (1993) at 23&-237; compare Evans, Principle and Pragmatism, above n6
"lit 152-153.
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money held for clients. The clients have complete control over the money held for
them in the trust account. lll It is only to be moved as the clients direct in
instructions given before or after the money is lodged in trust. And, while the
statutory deposits schemes take the money out of solicitors' immediate possession,
solicitors, and so their clients, keep ultimate control, as the money lodged in' an
SDA must be repaid to them on demand without prior questioning. 112
It is much rarer in the IOLTA debates to find parliamentarians prepared to
recognise that interest earned on clients' deposits, no matter'how much; is client
property. I 13 This is nevertheless the interest's inevitable moral and legal character.
Struggling to explain the nature of intangible property like bank interest, the courts
have often appealed to physical analogues - 'interest shall follow the principal,
as the shadow the body' .114 Although the physical analogue has been criticised,115
it does accurately portray the dependence ofinterest on the bank deposits. 'Money'
in the bank is itself a metaphor, representing the agreed extent of the bank's
indebtedness to the depositor. The amount of interest represents an agreed increase
in that indebtedness arising from the time the bank takes to repay the amounts that
"the depositor has lent. While, for many purposes, the law usefully segregates this
indebtedness into 'capital' and 'income', these remain mere subsets .of the one
relationship of debt between bank and customer. To this extent, US judges have
been the most technically accurate when they speak of interest as an '.increment'
to the bank's existing indebtedness. 116 It is nonsensical to present the interest~
as has happened in parliamentary debates about IOLTA - as money earned on
deposits, but independent of any prior indebtedness and without a creditor,
awaiting appropriation from the State ofNature by government or professi~n.117
The House ofLords' decision in Brown 118 strongly confirms this analysis. The
structure of theoaiikirig arrangements in Brown was similar to that of the statutory
deposits scheme but with the redistribution ma4e directly to the lawyer. A Scottish
111 With only the potential qualification that the money may possibly be withheld if subject to a
solicitor's lien for unpaid work: see Dal Pont, above n16 at 870-874.
112 LPA 1970 (ACT) sI24(1);LPA 1987(NSW)s65(I)(b);LPA 1974 (NT) s81(1);LPA 1996 (Vic)
sI8I(1)(b); Legal Contribution Trust Act 1967 (WA) sI2(1). Compare LPA 1981 (SA) s54(9);
LPA 1993 (Tas) sI03(1).
113 For explicit recognition, see, for example, Eric Lloyd, Queensland, Legislative Assembly,
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 2 December 1964 at 2029, 2030; Lawrence Springborg,
Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 26 November 2004 at
5243-5244; Patmore, above n98 at 5434, 5436, 5504; Anthony Fletcher, Tasmania, Legislative
Council, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 6 December 1990 at 4414.
114 Beckfield v Tobin (1749) I Yes Sen 308 at 310; 27 ER 1049 at 1051 (Hardwicke LJ); Phillips,
above n83 at 165. Kitto J used a similar 'tree' and 'fruit' analogue in Shepherd v Federal
Commissioner ofTaxation (1965) 113 CLR 385 at 396. '
115 Phillips, above n83 at 181-182 (Breyer 1).
116 Bordy v Smith 34 NW 2d 331 (1948),334 (Wenke 1); University afSouth Carolina v Elliott 149
SE 2d 433 (1966), 434 (Bussey 1); State Highway Commission v Spainhower 504 SW 2d 121
(1973), 126 (Higgins 1); State, ex rei Board ofCounty Commissioners ofBernallilo County v
Montoya 575 P 2d 605 (1978), 607 (McManus C1).
117 See, for ex~ple, Percy Smith, Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates
(Hansard), 2 December 1964 at 2029.
118 Brown, above n7.
solicitor - whose fum was also involved in a range of commercial activities -
received large amolUlts from business clients into his client current accolUlt.
Individually large receipts would be invested separately in savings accounts, but
others were thought too small to be likely to earn net interest for the client, once
transaction costs (like bank charges and administrative expenses) were deducted.
However, when the client account approached a balance of £1 0000, the solicitor
would withdraw £5000 and lodge it in a savings account. The interest earned there
was paid to the solicitor's own office account, and he treated it as his own. This
was the origin of his dispute with the Inland Revenue Commissioners, for if the
interest was the solicitor's, he was entitled to some tax relief. The practice was
common amongst Scottish solicitors, and endorsed by the Scottish Law Society.
The Lords lUlanimously regarded the interest earned as the property of the
clients from whom money in the client account had been received.i19 Little
analysis was undertaken to reach 'that conclusion - Lord Donovan was the most
loquacious in saying that ~none of the interest is his income at all, but that of his
clients to whom the capital, upon which the interest was paid, belongs' .120 Lord
Reid recognised that the solicitor's pooling arrangements alone made it possible
"for these client deposits to earn any interest, '[bJut that does not appear to me to
make any difference in law'. 121' The Lords also agreed that this was not affected
by 'the difficulties that the solicitor might have had in apportioning interest
between clients,122 the fact that other Scottish solicitors commonly did the same
thing,123 or that the law society had endorsed the practice.124
A similar conclusion was reached in Phillips,125 the first takings clause
challenge to IOLTA that was considered by the US Supreme Court. It held by a 5:4
majority126 that the interest earned on accounts maintained under the Texas IOLTA
scheme was the 'private property' of attorneys' clients for the purposes of the
takings clause~ The court left the questions whether tllere was a 'taking', and
whether Texas gave 'just compensation', to be considered on remand, although a
federal appeals court did eventually strike the scheme down. 127 This
characterisation of the interest was certainly settled by the time, in Brown v Legal
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119 Id at 257 (Reid LJ), 260, 261-262 (Evershed LJ), 263, 264 (Guest LJ), 266-267 (Upjohn LJ),
268 (Donovan LJ). A unanimous Court of Session had already reached the same conclusion:
Brown v InlandRevenue Commissioners 1963 SC 331 at 337 (president Clyde LJ), 338 (Guthrie
LJ). Compare Paulsen, above n83 at 44-45 (Kidd J).
120 Brown, above n7 at 268.
121 Id at 257.
122 Id at 257 (Reid LJ), 261 (Evershed LJ), 266 (Upjohn LJ).
123 Id at 257-258 (Reid LJ), 260 (Evershed LJ), 263 (Guest LJ), 266 (Upjohn LJ).
124 Id at 258 (Reid LJ), 261-262 (Evershed LJ), 264 (Guest LJ), 267 (Upjohn LJ), 268 (Donovan
LJ).
125 Above n83.
126 Rehnquist eJ, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas JJ; Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer
JJ dissenting,
127 524 US 156 (1998),172. On remand, the Texas scheme was initially upheld: Washington Legal
Foundation, above n130. However, this was overruled by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which held the scheme invalid on the ground that just compensation had not been given:
Washington Legal Foundation [No 2J, above n109.
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Foundation ofWashington, 128 the Supreme Court held that the Washington IOLTA
scheme survived a takings clause analysis. Following Phillips, the whole court
accepted that the interest was clients' private property and that, through the IOLTA
scheme, the state did 'take' it. 129 However, a 5:4 majority ruled that the clients had
incurred no loss and, so, should receive no compensation under the takings
clause. 130
The refusal ofAustralian parliaments to concede anything to the clients' moral
claims over the management of IOLTA schemes therefore brings the schemes'
ethical structure into serious question. When the statutory deposits scheme was
being debated in the NSW Parliament, the government appealed to Brown as
providing the 'objective' moral basis to the scheme. 131 The Attorney-General
presented Lord Upjohn as stating, as he did, that the solicitor's use of the interest
on pooled client money in the savings account was 'an entirely innocent and
commonsense practice' .132 The Attorney-General omitted, however, Lord
Upjohn's next sentence in Brown: '[b]ut this interest belongs collectively to the
clients and not to the solicitor' .133 Already selectively quoted, Brown was then
said to sUP1?0rt the idea that the scheme was not using other people's money for
public programs,134 despite its ratio that the interest belonged to the clients.~The
only organization or individmll to lose anything by reason of this legislation will
t!e the bankers'. 135 The clients' moral claims to the interest have therefore not only
been ignored, the general law claims that they would have to the interest were
misrepresented. 136 This is in the sharpest contrast to Brown's effect in the United
Kingdom (UK), where strict procedures for solicitors to return interest on client
money were introduced, and are still maintained. The UK professions set scales
indicating when given amounts to be held for different periods have to be invested
for the client's benefit. 137
128 123 SCt 1406 (2003).
129 Id at 1422-1423.
130 Souter, O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer JJ; Rehnquist CJ, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas
JJ dissenting.
131 Kenneth McCaw, New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),
15 March 1967 at 4290.
132 Id at 4291; Arthur Bridges, New South Wales, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates
(Hansard), 15 March 1967 at 4218, quoting Brown, above n7 at 267.
133 Brown, above n7 at 267.
134 McCaw, above n131 at 4291.
135 Ibid.
136 Though, in all probability, innocently. The speeches in both the Legislative Assembly and the
Legislative Council were similar, with the same parts of Brown quoted. This suggests that the
Ministers were relying on common briefIng papers in their presentation of the effect ofBrown.
137 England and Wales: Solicitors Accounts Rules 1998 (Eng) r24. Northern Ireland: Solicitors
Accounts Regulations 1998 (UK) r15. Scotland: Solicitors (Scotland) Accounts etc Rules 2001
(UK) rll. See Lesley King, 'Solicitors Accounts Rules 1998' (1998) 142 Sol J968 at 969. For
the initial reaction to Brown, see 'Res Nullius?' (1964) 108 Sol J625; 'The Horns ofa Deposit'
(1964) 108 Sol J945.
Even if the amoWlt that is earned on any single client's trust accoWlt deposit is
barely discernible, the clients have a moral claim on the management of the
interest increment to the deposits they have made. 138 It is only the convenience of
the arrangement that leads to the suggestion, effectively made when IOLTA
schemes have been introduced, that clients' have a moral claim over the
management of their capital, but not over its income139 - as if the interest exists
independently of the deposit on which it was calculated. However, despite the
clients' moral claims,' Australian IOLTA schemes direct that interest to public
programs, often, in the place ofreturning to clients the interest that could be earned
by them and, almost always, without clients' knowledge. Furthermore, as will be
seen, in some states the spending of that money remains secret, with IOLTA
Trustees Wlwilling to accoWlt for it publicly.
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B. Investing Duties
The redistribution of IOLTA from clients is often justified by the claim that,
individually, the deposits held in trust accoWlts could not earn net interest for the
client, on~e transaction costs are taken into accoWlt. 140 Even if taken as a part of
pooled money (whether in im SDA or the trust accoWlt's residual balance) that
'earns interest, the interest apportioned to an individual client would be
infmitesimal or, if measurable, would still be less than the costs of apportionment.
The suggestion that apportionment between clients is that costly is, with modem
information technology, indefensible,141 but even on the brave assumption that it
is, the argument also depends on trust accoWlt deposits being of small amoWlts
held for short periods. That further assumption is commonly made,142 but bears
little relationship to actual practice in Australia where, first of all, there is still no
clear professional duty"on solicitors to invest money that is capable of earning net
interest for clients and, secondly, there is evidence that investable amoWlts could
be commonly held in the trust accoWlt.
138 Compare DeLaine, above n4 at 193.
139 Dan Chern, 'Why Mandatory IOLTAs Should Be Eliminated' (1997) 4 Texas Wesleyan LR 123
at 140-141.
140 Dulong, above n4 at 119-120; Bryan Goldstein, 'Phillips v Washington Legal Foundation: The
Future of IOLTA' (1999) 79 Boston University LR 1277 at 1287, 1295-1296; David Luban,
'Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public Interest Lawyers' (2003) 91 Cal
LR 209 at 230; Katharine Smith, 'IOLTA in the Balance: The Battle of Legality and Morality
Between Robin Hood and the Miser' (2003) 34 St Mary's LJ 969 at 975-976; Phillips, above
n83 at 181-182 (Breyer 1).
141 On this point, see Solicitors Guarantee Fund, above n6 at 252; J David Breemer, 'IOLTA in'the
New Millenium: 'Slowly Sinking Under the Weight ofthe Takings Clause' (2000) 23 Hawaii LR
221 at 245-246; Imperial, above n99 at 264; Salmons, above n87 at 265; Norman Mannix, New
South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 15 March 1967 at
. 4299; Fletcher, above nIB at 4414; Haddon Storey, Victoria, Legislative Council,
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 14 June 1983 at 2737; Brown, above n7 at 257 (Reid L1),
,,' 261 (Evershed L1), 266 (Upjohn L1).
142 See, for example, McCaw, above nBI at 4291; Peter Delamothe, Queensland, Legislative
. Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 2 December 1964 at 20 16; Wilcox, above n44 at
1993. .
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In practice, Australian solicitors often arrange for any sizable amount entrusted
by a client to be deposited as controlled money in a separate savings account and,
for the most part, recommend to the client that that be done. However, professional
rule-makers, including courts and tribunals, are yet to articulate a solicitor's duty
to recommend this. 143 The Queensland Law Society tried to secure the discipline
of a solicitor who failed to invest amounts between $4800 and $17000 held in the
trust account, but the charges were dismissed once they met the tribunal's inability
to determine the time by which a deposit in a controlled money account should
have been made. 144 Under the current rules of conduct, it would be difficult to
sustain a charge of failing to advise investment. This is a marked' contrast to other
jurisdictions, which demand a deeper level of ethical engagement of lawyers to
secure private financial returns to clients.
In NZ, the introduction in 1991 of a single IOLTA scheme, by which banks
would credit interest to trust accounts but pay it to the IOLTA Trustee,145 was
coupled with a legislated duty to ensure that, wherever possible, client money is
placed in'a controlled money account. The Law Practitioners Act provides: 146
It shall be the duty of a solicitor to ensure that, wherever practicable, all money
held on behalf of a person by that solicitor earns interest for the benefit of that
person, unless -
(a) That person instructs otherwise; or
(b) It is not reasonable or practicable (whether because ofthe smallness of the
amount, the shortness of the period for which the solicitor is to hold the
money, or for any other reason) for the solicitor to invest the money, at the
direction ofthat person, so that interest is payable on it for the benefit ofthat
person.' - -"---"-- ,._. ._._
British and American lawyers also have responsibilities to lodge client money in
controlled money accounts whenever possible. 147 For the UK that means thatthere
is no diversion of IOLTA to public programs whatsoever, but in the United States
this duty is built into the structure <:>fmost IOLTA schemes. For example, under the
Washington scheme consideredin Brown vLegal Foundation ofWashington, 148 an
attorney was not to deposit inyestable amounts in an IOLTA account. So long as
the rule was followed, money in an IOLTA account, by definition, could not have
earned net interest if invested. Accordingly, .the reason why the Supreme Court
found that, despite a 'taking' ofprivate property, the takings clause did not require
compensation to be paid to the clien~, was that there was no loss to the client by
143 Trust, above n6 ·at 78. "
144 ReX SCT/40 (2001) 8BRDA 10 at 20.
145 Law Practitioners Amendment Act 1991 (NZ) s4; Law Practitioners Amendment Act 1982 (NZ)
ss91A-91N.
146 Law Practitioners Amendment Act 1991 (NZ) s3; Law Practitioners Amendment Act 1982 (NZ)
s89A.
147 Solicitors Accounts Rules 1998 (Eng) r24; Solicitors Accounts Regulations 1998 (UK) rl5;
Solicitors (Scotland) Accounts etc Rules 2001 (UK) r11; Boone, above n4 at 541; Dulong, above
n4 at 95; salmons, above n87 at 261-262.
148 Above n128.
lodging the client's money in an IOLTA account. 149 If investable amounts were
deposited in an IOLTA account, the client's remedy was against the attorney for
breaking the rules of the scheme. 150 That did not invalidate the scheme itself.
Not only is this not required of Australian solicitors, the evidence of
disciplinary cases suggests that, especially if money is entrusted on account of
potential costs and outlays, investable amounts are routinely kept in the trust
account. Further, in their reasons for decision, judges and tribunal members pass
over this practice without remark,151 confIrming sub silentio both that the general
practice oflodging investable amounts in a controlled money account is not yet an
enforceable duty, and how common it is not to invest when that is convenient for
the solicitors. Without this duty as a threshold for money passing into lOLTA
schemes, it is doubtful that any Australian IOLTA scheme would survive anything
akin to a takings clause analysis. But then, it would not have to. What is certain is
that, although it could never.be quantified, interest that could be retum'ed to clients
is being redistributed to public programs without their knowledge.
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Even if'solicitors were to sift investable amounts from the trust account, lOLTA
schemes would still not rest on aD acceptable ethical foundation, as a duty to advise
lodgment in a controlled money account does not address the basic problem that
clients have - at the very least - moral claims over interest that is only capable
of being earned on pooled aggregations of trust account deposits. This, of course,
was the central point of Brown, which confirms that, without the lOLTA statutes,
clients would have a prior legal claim to this interest. That basic claim must be
given effect before lOLTA schemes in Australia can be ethically justified, and the
surest means of recognising the strength of that claim is allowing client choice.
American commentators, fearing possible invalidation of lOtTA· schemes
under the takings clause, have consistently suggested that reinforcing client choice
is the best option for salvaging IOLTA in the US. 152 Any moral objection to the
redistribution of value to public programs immediately dissolves once the client,
informed of the use that can be made of his money through IOLTA schemes,
consents to that use. However, any accommodation of client choice is lacking
completely in all Australian lOLTA schemes. It would be exceptional to fInd
solicitors who, when asking for money to ·be kept in trust, advise clients that it will
not eam them interest, or that; when pooled with other money in the trust account,
it will earn interest that helps to fund programs like legal aid and the maintenance
of a fidelity fund. There is, despite increasing mandatory disclosure requirements
on solicitors,153 no duty to give this advice..And, in times whcn even sn:all




152 Anderson, above n33 at 746-749; Breemer, above n141 at 244; Goldstein, above nl40 at 1287,
1296; Salmons, above n87 at 271-273; Smith, above n117 at 1004-1005.
153 For example, see Dal Pont, above n16 at 26-33.
'custom' that clients would be conscious that trust account deposits would not
attract interest for them, let alone be aware that the interest that was being credited
(actually and notionally) to trust account deposits was being used for public
programs. A similar issue was considered in Brown, where the solicitor claimed
that his clients had agreed that he keep the interest on the savings account as they
had impliedly agreed to the custom of Scottish solicitors to take it as a fee for the
time and trouble involved in handling client money. The House ofLords disagreed
that it was 'customary', although admitting that it was common. 154 Implicit in
Brown is the suggestion that, even if there were in Scotland a custom that this
money could be treated as business receipts, it would not be sufficient to meet the
standards ofconsent required before a solicitor could profit from the use ofclients'
money. 155
Advice to clients that interest is not earned for them in the trust account, but
that government arrangements lead to its earning revenue for public programs,
would allow the inference that, if money is entrusted to solicitors in these
conditions, the clients have consented to the redistribution of value to those
programs. 156 Of course, if that consent is to be real then clients must retain the
right'to direct that their money be placed in controlled money accounts even if,
given transaction costs and the small interest credited, that means they invest at a
personal loss. David Luban objects that this is just 'a spite right',157 a miserly
refusal to allow public use of the money at the client's own cost. And so it is.
However, given the irrationality of that choice, few would make it. This is also a
legal right that clients already have. If, having been advised that depositing money
in a controlled money account will, after transaction costs are incurred, be
unprofitable, the client still directs that money be invested, the solicitor must
follow the client's instructions. And, recognising that the client is, in this context,
-exercising a proprietary right in money being requested by the solicitor, the
solicitor's moral158 and legal duty is to give effect to the preference of the owner
of the property - no matter how irrational or niggardly it is, or how needy or
meritorious others might be. The difference is that, at present, the client would
generally make that choice without being advised how, if the money were
deposited in the trust account, the income earned on it is going to be used.
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D. Representation and Accountability
Two questions of accountability arise under some AustralianIOLTA schemes: the
identity of the IOLTA Trustee, and its willingness to disclose how it manages its
trust. Having established that IOLTA schemes raise questions of distributive
justice between clients, bank shareholders and the various beneficiaries of the
schemes' programs, it remains to be asked why, in seven Australian jurisdictions,
government continues to place the responsibility for effecting the redistribution
onto private institutions - a law society,159 or a statutory trUstee on which it is
represented. 160 This is regrettable, as (especially given the size of the allocation to
legal aid) lawyers are direct beneficiaries of most IOLTA programs and the law
society, whatever regulatory roles it may have, is principally the representative of
lawyers. There is an appearance of interest. In some cases, the law society's
ostensible interest has no underlying reality as its role is mechanical, with
allocations being directed by the governing Act or government. Still, as has been
seen, there is evidence that some law societies' real self-interest has directed how
they have allocated IOLTA. 161 But it is not merely to contradict claims that IOLTA
is a solicitors' 'fringe benefit scheme>l62 that it is suggested that the government,. .
should be the IOLTA Trustee. It is the only institution that represents all citizens
who could conceivably have a claim on IOLTA, including clients,163 and the only
insdtution that can properly act as an agent of distributive justice. The Victorian
Legal Practice Board was the first IOLTA Trustee to be independent of a law
society,164 and it is only under the new Queensland rules that a state government
has, for the first time, become an IOLTA Trustee.165
The conflation of private and public roles in law societies or statutory trustees
may also explain why, in some states, the IOLTA Trustee's accounting for its
management of IOLTA schemes remains unacceptably poor. There are no reports
of residual trust account baIiiiic'es,and few of interest rates and SDA bilinces. 166 .
The terms of residual balances schemes, which are after all arrangements made
over a notio'nal bank indebtedness to clients, are not available to clients or the
general public. The ACT, NSW, SA and Victorian IOLTA Trustees do fully report
the revenue raised, and the amount of allocations. In other cases, though, IOLTA
scheme accounts are retained privately but made available on request. 167 Under
the old Queensland rules, the statutory deposits scheme earnings can only be
estimated by reconstructing a range of accounts under the assumption that the
governing Acts had been followed. 168 It is evident that some law societies, while
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prepared to publish IOLTA accounts to solicitor-members, are occasionally
uncertain whether the accounts can be disclosed to the public. The confusion is
understandable, given that a public role is being carried by a private organisation,
but again supports the view that it is best not to place the management of IOLTA
schemes with law societies if the actual nature of the trust they hold is not readily
appreciated.
5. Restoring Trust to IOLTA
From the early twentieth century, government and law societies have taken
admirable steps to buttress the trust created when solicitors hold client money,
regulating closely how client interests, client control of the money and solicitors'
accountability are to be respected and managed. Nevertheless, government and
law societies have themselves refused to respect those demands when they (in
statutory deposits schemes) hold client money or (in residual deposits schemes)
take advantage of it. Worse, they have often done so knowing that a moral'trus't:is
being violated. 169 All Australian IOLTA schemes are bereft of safeguards lei
promote clients' knowledge and control ofgovernment and law society'use oftheir .
money, and consent to this use. Some, perhaps reflecting an embarrassment' about'
IOLTA scllemes, fail to provide any accounting for it. Against this moral trust; the
interests of the states, the professions, other beneficiaries ofIOLTA progr~s and
the banks are consistently given priority over those of the banks' creditors -
whose deposits make it all possible.
The reasons are obvious. IOLTA revenue, now over $110 million annually, is
vital for significant public programs. As the account oflegal aid funding shows, its
immediate loss would be catastrophic for the administration of justice in some
states. Effectively, it is an important expropriation for public use. Still, it is an
expropriation without a taxing or appropriation statute, or even notice to those who
have the greatest moral "claim to the money, and so fails to meet the mosfbasic
public standards for raising public revenue.
Government and professions are now IOLTA-dependent, and so are being
asked to accommodate clients' moral claims from a position ofactually conflicting
interests and duties. 170 Undoubtedly, the straightforward response to the unethical
. structure ofIOLTA would be to return any interest earned on trust account deposits
to clientsl71 - apportionments between clients can now be easily made. But the
extent ofgovernment interest in IOLTA makes this unlikely.
However, an ethical structure for IOLTA can be developed if this moral trust is
reinforced by an explicit, enforceable duty on solicitors to recommend to clients
that investable amounts be lodged in controlled money accounts; and to advise
clients that money held in the trust account will not earn them interest, but will help
168 See Table 3 note c.
169 See Solicitors Guarantee Fund, above n6 at 251-252, 319-320, 394-395; Principle and
Pragmatism, above n6 at 153, 157; Trust, above n6 at 78.
170 Principle and Pragmatism, above n6 at 153; Whose Money, above n6 at 224-225.
171 Springborg, above niB at 5244.
earn funds for public programs. The practice of entrusting the management of
IOLTA to law societies and statutory trustee corporations also requires serious
reconsideration. The recent assumption by the Queensland Government of the role
of the state's IOLTA Trustee is therefore a more promising development: having a
better appearance; improving public accountability; setting distributive justice on
its proper institutional foundation; and showing more honestly that IOLTA is a
public expropriation.
Evans believes that, given changes in banking practice, trust account deposits
are a declining source of capital for the earning of revenue and that, for pragmatic
and ethical reasons, government and professions should be \yeaning themselves
from their reliance on IOLTA. l72 This is more imperative in the larger states, where
legal aid coiiunissions rely so significantly on allocations from IOLTA schemes.
Any change to the ethical structure ofIOLTA that improves both client knowledge
of the schemes and choice over the destination of client money will also reduce
returns made to public programs: This may also mean that IOLTA returns are
reduced to a point at which the cumbersome but more effective statutory deposits
schemes lose their comparative advantage over residual balances schemes, and carl
either be ab~doned completely or substituted with the Canadian schenie.173
However, a government and professional interest in (what is morally) client
income can, with ethical integritY, be preserved, although the present extent ofthat
inte~est should be reduced. It is merely expecting ofgovernment and the guardians
of the law the same standards that they expect of others.
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